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CUSTODY OF THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
FRANCES PATRICIA SOLARI*
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, an illegitimate child was considered filius nullius, the
son of no one.' As the law of illegitimates developed, a presumption
arose in favor of the mother of an illegitimate child. If a putative father'
desired custody of his illegitimate child, he had to show the mother was
unfit before he could win custody of his child.
This presumption in favor of the mother was reaffirmed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court as late as 1965 in Jolly Y. Queen.' In Jolly, the
putative father and his wife sought custody of his illegitimate child over
the child's mother and her husband. The trial court found that both
couples were persons of good character and were fit and proper persons
to have custody of the minor child. The trial court further found that it
was in the best interests of the minor child to award custody to his father
for nine months out of the year and to his mother for three months, with
visitation rights to the respective noncustodial parent.'
In reversing the trial court's decision, the North Carolina Supreme
Court stated:
It is well settled law in this State, and it seems to be universally so held,
that the mother of an illegitimate child is its natural guardian, and, as
such, has the legal right to its custody, care and control, if a suitable
person, even though others may offer more material advantages in life for
the child.5
The court said that the right of the mother to custody of her illegiti-
mate child was paramount to that of the putative father. To defeat the
mother's paramount right, the putative father must show that she is unfit
to care for the child. Once it is shown that the mother is unfit, the child's
best interest "overrides" the mother's paramount right to custody.6
Therefore, even though the trial court had determined that the child's
interest would best be served by awarding custody to the father for nine
* J.D. summa cum laude (NCCU 1982); M.LS. (NCCU 1989). Acting associatc law librarian
and assistant professor of law, NCCU.
1. See g., Dellinger v. Bollinger. 242 N.C. 696. 699. 89 S.F-2d 592, 594 (1955).
2. As used here. "putativt father" refers to the known father of an illegitimate child.
3. 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592.
4. Id. at 713, 142 S.E.2d at 594.
5. Id.. 142 S.F.2d at 595 (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 714, 142 S.E.2d at 596.
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months, the mother's paramount right to custody was not defeated be-
cause the trial court also found that she was a fit and proper person to
have custody.
The supreme court noted particularly that the putative father had
never legitimated his son pursuant to the bastardy statutes.7 Therefore,
the child could not inherit from his father or his father's relatives." The
court also noted that the putative father's consent would not be necessary
if the child's mother and her husband decided to adopt the child.9
Two years after the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Jolly, and
against this common law background, the North Carolina legislature
passed North Carolina General Statute section 49-15.t0 That statute
provides:
Upon and after the establishment of paternity of an illegitimate child pur-
suant to G.S. 49-14, the rights dute; and obligations of the mother and
father so established. with regard to support and custody of the child shall
be the same, and may be determined and enforced in the same manner as
if the child were the legitimate child of such father and mother. When
paternity has been established, the father becomes responsible for medi-
cal expenses incident to the pregnancy and birth of the child."
The custody of a legitimate child is controlled by North Carolina Gen-
eral Statute section 50-13.29(a) (1987). The statute provides that the
court shall award custody of a minor child "to such person, agency, or-
ganization or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of
the child.... Between the mother and father, whether natural or adop-
tive, no presumption shall apply as to who will better promote the inter-
est and welfare of the child."
Reading section 49-15 in pari materia with section 50-13.2, it is clear
that the legislature intended to abolish the common law presumption in
favor of the mother of an illegitimate child. The standard in custody
disputes between parents of an illegitimate child, once the child is legiti-
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 49. art. 11. cited in 264 N.C. at 715, 142 S.&2d at 595.
8. 264 NC. at 715. 142 S.E.2d at 595.
9. Id.. 142 S.E2d at 596 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48.6(a)). Under current North Carolina
law, the putative father's consent is necessary for adoption of the child if paternity has been estab-
lished, if the child has been legitimated in accordance with N.C. GnN. StAT. § 49-10 (1984). or if the
father has provided substantial support or consistent cae for the child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-
6(aX3) (1984). Moreover, for the purposes of Chapter 48 of the General Statutes, which covers
adoptions, the word "parent" is defined as "the biological or legal mother or father of a child." Id.
at § 48-29(5).
10. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 993, § 1.
I1. NC. G.N. STAT. § 49-15 (1984) (emphasis added). Section 49-14 allows a civil action to be
brought to establish paternity. Section 49-10 provides the means by which a child may be legiti-
mated. The fundamental distinction between a child whose paternity is established pursuant to § 49-
15 and one who is legitimated pursuant to § 49-10 is that the legitimated child is entitled to take real
and personal property from both parents through succession, inheritance, or distribution, and in the
event of the child's death, his property is distributed according to the Intestate Succession Act, as if
he had been born in lawful wedlock. rd. at § 49-11.
2
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mated or paternity is established, should be the same as that applied in
custody disputes between the parents of a legitimate child. That stan-
dard is the best interest of the child.
The legislative abolition of the common law presumption has been rec-
ognized by North Carolina courts 12 and commentators. 13 In Conley v.
Johnson," the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the putative
father of an illegitimate child was entitled to visit with his child, and that
the trial court was authorized to hold the mother in contempt of court
for refusing to allow the putative father's court-ordered visitation
rights.1
The court specifically addressed the mother's argument that under the
common law, the putative father of an illegitimate child was not entitled
to visitation absent consent of the mother. The court found that, in pass-
ing section 49-15, the North Carolina legislature abrogated the common
law rule and instead provided that once paternity is established, custody
and visitation of an illegitimate child should be decided in the same man-
ner as if the child were legitimate. 6 The court quoted section 50-13.2(b)
and stated the trial court should award custody to such person "as will in
the opinion of the judge best promote the interest and welfare of the
child.""
While Conley dealt only with visitation and not custody of the illegiti-
mate child, the same principle should be applied in either event. Under
the current statutory scheme, the court must determine what is in the
best interest of the child without applying presumptions in favor of either
parent. The rule that the putative father could not visit with his child
absent consent of the mother was part of the common law presumption
in favor of the mother. The Conley court rightly recognized that the leg-
islature abrograted the presumption by enacting section 49-15.
In Smith v. Price,'" the mother of an illegitimate child instituted a civil
action seeking a judicial determination that defendant was the father of
her child and praying for custody and child support. The defendant de-
nied paternity and countersued the plaintiff mother for fraud. The trial
court found that defendant was the father of the child and granted plain-
tiff's motion for directed verdict on defendant's counterclaim of fraud.
In addressing the correctness of the directed verdict, the court of appeals
noted that section 49-15 provides, "[o]nce paternity is established, the
proper custody and amount of support are determined in the same man-
12. See. eg. Conley v. Johnson. 24 N.C. App. 122. 210 S.E.2d 88 (1974).
13. See eg., R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 224, at 46 (1981).
14. 24 N.C. App. 122, 210 S.E2d 88.
13. Id. at 124. 210 S.E.2d at 90.
16. I'd. at 123-24, 210 S.E.2d at 89.
17. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b). now codified at § 50-13.2(a)).
18. 74 N.C. App. 413. 328 S.E.2d 811 (1985).
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ner as for a legitimate child."" The court stated, "In making this deter-
mination, the court has considerable discretion but the welfare of the
child is the primary consideration."'2
In spite of the decisions in Conley and Price, one commentator on
North Carolina domestic relations law has said, as late as 1983, that the
common law presumption in favor of the mother still applies. In his
book entitled North Carolina Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody, Lloyd
Kelso has this to say: "Unlike the legitimate child, the mother's right to
custody of an illegitimate child is superior to that of the father. Her
permanent right to general custody will not be denied except by a show-
ing of her unfitness as a parent or of other special circumstances."
2'
There has been at least one case decided by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals since the passage of section 49-15 implying that the common
law presumption is still valid in North Carolina.' In In re Custody of
Owenby, the putative father, William Thomas Taylor, and the mother,
Dorothy Owenby, lived together for a number of years during which
time three children were born. After Taylor and Owenby separated, the
trial court placed temporary custody of the children with the Child Wel-
fare Department. Shortly thereafter, Owenby married Kenneth Howell
and petitioned the court for custody of her three children. The trial
court found that neither Taylor nor Owenby were fit parents and that the
interests of the children would best be served by allowing their custody to
remain with the welfare department. Owenby appealed."
The court of appeals cited Jolly v. Queen for the proposition that
"(o]rdinarily, if a suitable person, the mother of an illegitimate child is its
natural guardian, and, as such, has the legal right to its custody, care and
control." 24 The court recognized the mother's paramount right to cus-
tody, but nevertheless upheld the trial court's decision. The court stated
that the children's best interests and welfare are the determining factors
and that they will override the mother's right to custody if she is shown
to be unfit." Although Owenby was decided over a year after the passage
of section 49-15, the court did not mention the statute in its opinion.
To the extent Owenby implies the common law presumption is still in
effect in North Carolina even after the passage of section 49-15, the deci-
sion is wrong. A statutory analysis of section 49-15 mandates the conclu-
sion that the North Carolina legislature intended to abrogate the
19. Id. at 422, 328 S.E.2d at 817.
20. Id.
21. L KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA DIvORCE, AIMONY AND CHILD CUSTODY 1 9-2, at 96
(1983). Mr. Kelso does not elaborate on what would constitute -special circumstances."
22. In re Cukody of Owenby, 3 N.C. App. 53. 164 S.E2d 55 (1968).
23. Id. at 54, 164 S.E.2d at 55-56.
24. Id.. 164 S.E.2d at 56.
25. Id.
4
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common law presumption. The test in all child custody cases, whether
the child in question is legitimate or illegitimate, is the best interest of the
child. Were the North Carolina courts to hold that the common law
presumption remains in effect after the passage of section 49-15, illegiti-
mate children would be treated differently from legitimate children on so
fundamental an issue that there would be a certain violation of the illegit-
imate child's constitutional right to equal protection. Moreovei, the pu-
tative father would have a strong argument that the presumption violates
his rights to equal protection as well.
II. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF SECION 49-15
The role of the judiciary in applying a statute to a given set of facts is
to determine what the legislature intended by the words of the statute
and then to carry out that intention. "By definition, statutory law is su-
perior in authority to common law." '26 The North Carolina Constitution
places the legislative power within the North Carolina General Assem-
bly.2 For any North Carolina court to attempt to judicially amend a
statute would be a clear violation of this constitutional provision.2
When the application of a statute is brought into question, the role of the
court is to determine what the statute means and to apply it to the cir-
cumstances before the court.
In deciding the meaning of a statute, courts are guided by a number of
canons of statutory construction.2 9 Application of the relevant canons of
construction to section 49-15 leads to the indisputable conclusion that,
by passing the statute, the North Carolina legislature intended to abro-
gate the common law presumption that the mother of an illegitimate
child has a paramount right to custody of her child. Instead, the legisla-
ture mandated that the courts look to the child's best interest as the sole
test in determining matters of child custody, regardless of the legitimacy
of the child in question.
A. The Plain Meaning Rule3°
If the language of the statute is clear, the only duty that falls to the
26. W. TATS Y. LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 7 (1984).
27. "The legislative power of the State shall be vested in the General Assembly, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." N.C. Cons. art. !, s 1.
28. STATSKY. supra note 26. at 8.
29. The canons are not mandatory rules of construction, but are guidelines on how the courts
should interpret statutes. See id. at 83.
30. The Plain Meaning Rule is sometimes not considered a canon of construction since it only
applies when the words of a statute are clear and not open to interpretation by the courts. "Where
the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not
arise, and the rules which are said to aid doubtful meaning need no discussion." Id. at 3 (quoting
Caminetti v. United States. 242 U.S. 470. 485 (1917)).
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court is to apply the clear meaning of the statute to the facts before it.
31
The United States Supreme Court has said, "It is elementary that the
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language
in which... [it] is framed,... and if that is plain, the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms."' 32 An examination of the
relevant language of section 49-15 allows for only one interpretation:
Upon and after the establishment of paternity of an illegitimate child pur-
suant to G.S. 49-14, the rights, duties. and obligations of the mother and
father so established, with regard to support and custody of the child,
shall be the same, and may be determined and enforced in the same man-
ner. as if the child were the legitimate child of such father and mother.
33
The plain meaning of this statute is, once paternity is established, cus-
tody of illegitimate children shall be decided under the same test as that
applied to cases involving legitimate chi!dren. The statute is mandatory,
not discretionary, as evidenced by the language "shall be the same."
Such mandatory language does not leave room for interpretation.
Determinations of custody of legitimate children are controlled by sec-
tion 50-13.2(a):
An order for custody of a minor child entered pursuant to this section
shall award the custody of such child to such person ... as will best
promote the interest and welfare of the child. Between the mother and
father, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption shall awly as to
who will better promote the interest and welfare of the child.
Thus, when faced with a dispute between the mother and father of an
illegitimate child, the court's only duty is to determine whether it is in the
child's best interest to be placed with his mother or father. The court
should view each party and his or her respective circumstances objec-
tively, with no presumption in favor of either. The language of the stat-
utes is clear and not subject to interpretation. The court must apply the
31. See In re Estate of Stern v. Stern, 66 N.C. App. 507. 311 S.E.2d 909 (1984). The court
looked at NC. Gen. Stat. § 29-19 to determine whether the heirs of the alleged putative father of the
decedent Edward Gordon Stern had any rights to the decedent's estate. In holding that the require-
ments of the statute had not been met, the court stated, "It is well settled that '[wjhere the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no romn for judicial construction and the courts must
give it its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provi.
sions and limitations not contained therein." Id. at 510. 311 S.E.2d at 911 (citing 12 Sraowo's
N.C. INDEX 3D Statutes § 5.5 (1978)).
32. 242 U.S. at 485, quoted in STATsxy, supm note 26. at 75. The Plain Meaning Rule has
been codified in a few states. See- g. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1980):. "When the words of a law in
their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law
shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit." (quoted in STATSKY, supra note
26, at 76).
33. (emphasis added).
34. (1987). Section 50-13.1 provides that "[alny parent, relative, or other person, agency, or-
ganization or institution claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or
proceeding for the custody of the such child, as hereinafter provided." Neither section excludes or
makes exception for a putative father.
6
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statutory best interest test in custody cases involving both legitimate chil-
dren and illegitimate children whose paternity has been established.
Even if it could be argued the language of section 49-15 is not all that
clear and may allow for more than one interpretation, other relevant ca-
nons of construction require application of the best interest test in cus-
tody disputes between parents of an illegitimate child once paternity has
been established.
B. Legislative Intent
If unsure of the meaning of a particular statute, the court should at-
tempt to determine the legislative intent behind the statute, so that in
applying the statute, the court will carry out that intention. One method
of determining legislative intent is by application of the "mischief rule."' 3"
Under the mischief rule, the court should ask, "What mischief was the
legislature attempting to correct [in passing the statute]? What was the
objective of the statute?"
36
Looking at section 49-15, it is apparent that one mischief the North
Carolina legislature intended to correct was the often harsh results of
applying the common law presumption. 37 "The legislature has the power
to pass statutes that change the common law. When it does so, it has
given us what is called a statute in derogation of the common law."13 8
Section 49-15 is precisely such a statute. 9 Once the legislature passed
section 49-15 in derogation of the common law rule, North Carolina
courts were no longer at liberty to apply it.'
C. Statutes in Pani Materia
Section 49-15 provides that, once paternity is established, the rights,
duties, and obligations of the parents of an illegitimate child "shall be the
same as if the child were legitimate." The rights, duties, and obligations
of the parent of a legitimate child are set out in chapter 50 of the North
35. STATSKY, supra note 26. at 76.
36. Id.
37. See e.g., Jolly . Queen. 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965), discussed supra at pp. 1.2
(supreme court reversed trial court's grant of custody to putative father even though the trial court
found as fact that it was in the child's best interest to live with his father nine months per year).
38. STATSxY, supra note 26, at 7 (emphasis in original).
39. North Carolina courts have recognized that § 49-15 abrogated the common law presump-
tion. See. eg., Conley v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 122, 123-24, 210 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1974) (discussed
supra at pp. 3-4). The abrogation of the common law with respect to matters of child custody is not
without precedent. The common law rule that the father was generally entitled to custody of his
legitimate children has given way to the best interest test. See Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626,
630, 184 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1971).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986): "All such parts of the common law.., not abrogated,
repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared in full force within this State." Since § 49-15
abrogated the common law presumption, that presump-ion is no longer in force in this state.
7
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Carolina General Statutes. With respect to custody of a legitimate child,
section 50-13.2(a) provides that the court shall award custody to the per-
son who will best promote the welfare and interest of the child. That
section further provides that there shall be no presumption in favor of
either the mother or the father when it comes to determining who would
better serve the best interests of the child.
Statutes in pan materia ("on the same subject-) are to be interpreted
together even though they may have been passed at different time&...
The inclination to try to harmonize the two statutes is based on the
common-sense assumption that when the legislature enacted statutes on
the same topic, it most likely intended that they be consistent with each
other even though the statutes contain no reference to each other."
The two statutes, sections 49-15 and 50-13.2(a), do concern the same
subject - custody of minor children. It matters not that section 49-15
covers illegitimate children, nor that it does not specifically cite section
50-13.2(a). Section 49-15 rfers to the .-kw respecting the "rights, duties,
and obligations" of the parents of legitimate children. Custody of a mi-
nor is most certainly one of the primary rights, duties, and obligations of
any parent. When the legislature enacted section 49-15, it surely was
aware that there was a statute covering the rights, duties, and obligations
of parents of legitimate children, and it was to that statute that the legis-
lature must have referred when drafting section 49-15.
When section 49-15 was enacted in 1967, the statute then providing
the rules for custody of legitimate children was former section 17-39.142
That statute provided in part: "the judge may award the charge or cus-
tody of the child to such person, organization, agency or institution for
such time, under such regulations and restrictions, and with such provi-
sions and directions, as will, in the opinion of the judge, best promote the
interest and welfare of said child."4 3
The North Carolina legislators made reference to section 17-39.1 in
section 49-15 by referring to the rights, duties, and obligations of the
parents of legitimate children. Yet no provision was made in either sec-
tion to preserve the common law presumption. The only conclusion to
be drawn is that the legislature intended to abrogate the common law
presumption and adopt instead the best interest test set out in section 17-
39.1.
On July 6, 1967, one week after the passage of section 49-15, the North
Carolina General Assembly repealed section 17-39.1 and ratified sections
50-13.1 through 50-13.8." The newly adopted section 50-13.2(a) pro-
41. STASKY. supra note 26, at 93-94.
42. Originally enacted at 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 545, tpealed by 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws ch.
1153 § I.
43. N.C. GE. STAT. § 17-39.1.
44. 1967 N.C. Ses. Laws ch. 1153.
8
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vided, "An order for custody of a minor child entered pursuant to this
Section shall award the custody of such child to such person, agency,
organization or institution as will, in the opinion of the judge, best pro-
mote the interest and welfare of the child." Knowing that section 49-15
had just been passed one week earlier, the legislature had an opportunity
to make exception for the common law presumption, but chose not to do
so. Instead, the legislature reaffirmed the best interest test with no spe-
cial provisions for illegitimate children. Again, the only conclusion to be
drawn is that the legislature intended the best interest test to apply
equally to legitimate and illelitimate children.
In 1977, section 50-13.2(a) was amended to add the following:
"[B]etween the mother and father, whether natural or adoptive, there is
no presumption as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of
the child."4 This sentence remains as a part of the current version of
section 50-13.2(a). Again, the legislature made no provision to apply a
different standard in custody disputes involving illegitimate children.
Regardless of whether the child is legitimate or illegitimate, the standard
remains what has been called "the polar star by which the court is
guided"" - the best interest and welfare of the child.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Application of the common law presumption is an unconstitutional
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. The fourteenth amendment provides,
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." The common law presumption raises problems
with respect to the putative father's rights to equal protection and with
respect to the equal protection rights of the illegitimate child.
A. The Putative Father's Right to Equal Protection
By keeping the common law presumption intact, North Carolina
coirrts would be dictating disparate treatment between the father of an
i!!egitimate child and all other parents, including fathers of legitimate
children. In addition, the common law presumption draws a finer dis-
tinction between putative fathers on the one hand and unwed mothers on
the other. The United States Supreme Court has addressed both these
classifications, and has found constitutional violations with respect to
both.47
45. 1977 N.C ss Laws ch. 501 § 2.
46. See. e. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 572, 284 S.E.2d 171,173 (1981).
47. With respect to an unconstitutional classification between the unwed father and all other
parents. see StanleY v. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645 (1972). For an unconstitutional classification between
unwed fathers and unwed mothers, see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
9
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1. Classifications between the putative father and all other parents.
In Stanley v. Illinois,"" the Supreme Court addressed an Illinois statu-
tory scheme that allowed illegitimate children to be declared wards of the
state upon the death of their mother, over the objection ,of their natural
father, and without a determination that the father was unfit. Peter Stan-
ley, the appellant, had lived with Joan Stanley for eighteen years.
Although they had never married, they had three children. When Joan
died, the State of Illinois took custody of the children under a state iaw
providing that illegitimate children became wards of the state upon the
death of their mother. The law presumed fitness on behalf of married
fathers, whether widowed, divorced, or separated, and on behalf of all
mothers.49 Stanley appealed on the grounds that the Illinois statute vio-
lated both his due process rights and his rights to equal protection. The
Court framed the issue as, " is a presumption that distinguishes and bur-
dens all unwed fathers constitutionally repugnant?" The Court con-
cluded that,
as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by
denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose cus-
tody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Under Illinois law, the state could take charge of minor children of
any parent upon a showing that the children were abandoned or ne-
glected, and then only after the parent was given notice and a hearing to
determine fitness. On the other hand, the putative father was not entitled
to a hearing on his fitness as a parent. Upon the death of the children's
mother, the unwed father was presumed to be unfit to have custody of his
children.
5 2
The Court began its due process analysis by noting the importance of
familial relationships. "The rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed 'essential,"'" "'basic civil rights of man,' ,4 and
"'[r]ights far more precious... than property rights.' "" " 'It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for ob-
ligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.' 56 The court con-
cluded that Stanley's interest in the custody of his children was
48. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (construing IW. Rev. Stat.. ch. 37, §§ 702-1 to -5).
49. Id. at 646-47.
50. Id. at 649.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 650.
53. Id. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390. 399 (1923)).
54. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
55. Id. (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
56. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
10
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"cognizable and substantial."' "'
Illinois defended its statutory scheme on the basis that most unwed
fathers are not interested in caring or providing for their illegitimate off-
spring, and that therefore they may be presumed to be unfit parents.
While the court did not dispute this assertion, it stated that not all unwed
fathers are unfit, and that some are "wholly suited to have custody of
their children." 8 The Court recognized that, since the identities of
many unwed fathers were unascertainable, allowing the presumption
would further the legitimate state interest of judicial efficiency. However,
when the procedure forecloses determination of the precise issue at hand,
the best interests of the children, it runs "roughshod over the important
interests of both parent and child," 9 and therefore cannot stand consti-
tutional scrutiny.
After concluding that putative fathers have a due process right to a
hearing on fitness before their parental rights are terminated, the Court
turned to the equal protection argument. Since all parents other than
putative fathers were allowed a hearing on fitness before termination of
parental rights, the Court found that the statutory scheme unconstitu-
tionally infringed on the putative father's fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection.' The Court reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois
and remanded the case for further proceedings.6
Section 49-15 does not on its face raise a due process argument since
even putative fathers have a right to a hearing on custody. However, the
application of the common law presumption in favor of the unwed
mother is a violation of the father's fourteenth amendment rights to
equal protection under the law. The North Carolina legislature has spe-
cifically provided that there is to be no presumption in favor of either
parent when the custody dispute concerns a legitimate child.62 Any par-
ent is entitled to custody of his or her child upon a showing that such an
award will be in the child's best interest. The only person against whom
the common law presumption works is the putative father. He alone is
compelled to show not only that he is the best person to have custody of
57. Id. at 652.
58. Id. at 654. The court cited In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967), where
the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that an unwed father was best suited
to have custody of his illegitimate child. The Michigan court stated, "We are not aware of any
sociological data justifying the assumption that an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is
less likely to receive a proper upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was at one time
married to his mother .... " Id. at 146. 154 N.W.2d at 39 (quoted in 405 U.S. 654-55, n. 7).
59. 405 U.S. at 657.
60. Id. at 658.
61. Id. at 659. Chief justice Burger. with whom Justice Blackmun concurred, dissented on the
bases that the due process issue was not raised in state court, Id.. and that the state could legiti-
mately discriminate between unwed fathers and unwed mothers in the interest of protecting the
welfare of illegitimate children. Id. at 665.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a)
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his child, but also that the mother of the child is unfit. This additional
burden on the putative father is a violation of his right to equal
protection. 3
This is not to say that unwed fathers may never be treated differently.
In Quilloin v. Walcott," the Supreme Court found no constitutional vio-
lation in a Georgia statutory scheme that allowed putative fathers to
block adoption of their children only if they had legitimated their chil-
dren prior to institution of the adoption proceedings. Georgia law pro-
vided that the putative father's consent to adoption was not necessary
unless he had legitimated the child by marrying the mother, by acknowl-
edging paternity, or by petitioning the court for a judicial determination
of paternity."
In Quilloin, the putative father did nothing to legitimate his son until
the child was eleven years old. When the child's stepfather filed an adop-
tion petition, the putative father filed a petition to legitimate his child
and to object to the adoption. The trial court afforded the putative father
a hearing prior to ruling on his petition. At the hearing, the court con-
cluded that it would not be in the best interests of the child to allow the
father's petition for legitimation." The trial court denied appellant's
petition for legitimation and concluded that he had no standing to object
to the adoption by his son's stepfather.6'
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the adoption by the child's
stepfather did not break up an existing familial relationship, but merely
gave legal recognition to a family unit already in existence. Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not violate the father's due process
rights by deciding his legitimation petition on the basis of the child's best
interest.
The father also challenged the constitutionality of the adoption on the
basis that his authority to block the adoption was subject to a different
standard than that applied to a married father. The Court found this
argument without merit as well. The Court based its decision on the fact
that appellant had never shouldered any responsibility toward the child,
and indeed, was not then seeking physical custody of the child. The
Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for the state to distin-
guish the married father and the unmarried father on the basis of their
63. Robert E. Lee. a noted commentator on North Carolina domestic relations law has said
that after Stanley P. Illinois and the enactment of section 50-13.2 (no presumption as between natural
parents), "it should not be difficult for the putative father of an illegitimate child to obtain custody of
the child if the court finds such will 'best promote the interest and weifare of the child."'" R. LEE,
N.C. FAMILY LAw § 224. at 46 (1981).
64. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
65. Id. at 249 (citing GA. CODE § s 74-101. -103. -203. & -403(3) (1975).
66. Id. at 2.50-51.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 255.
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respective commitment to the welfare of the child.69
If North Carolina allows the common law presumption in favor of the
unwed mother to stand, it is precluding the putative father from the ben-
efit of the best interest test. In all other custody disputes, the court must
base its decision regarding custody on what is in the best interest of the
child. The same standard should be applied to custody disputes between
the parents of illegitimate children. Otherwise, the courts would create a
classification requiring differing standards based solely on the marital sta-
tus of the parents. Such a state-created classification, at the very least,
must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 0
The primary legitimate state interest in treating other parents differ-
ently than putative fathers is to further the best interest of the child.7 '
The common law presumption should not be allowed to prevent a court
from basing its decision on the child's best interest. Burdening the puta-
tive father with an additional requirement to prove the unfitness of the
mother bears no rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of
providing for the child's best interest.72 Therefore, application of the
presumption is a violation of the putative father's constitutional right to
equal protection.
2. Classifications between the putative father
and the unwed mother
While the classification between the putative father and all other par-
ents is subject only to the rational basis test because of the lack of a
suspect classification, this is not the case when the classification is strictly
between fathers and mothers of illegitimate children. In that instance,
the classification is based on gender alone. The Suprerme Court has held,
in order to withstand constitutional challenge, a gender based classifica-
tion must serve an important governmental objective and must be sub-
69. Id. at 256.
70. It may be argued that more than a rational basis is required for this particular classification
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, the distinction between unwed fathers and other
parents is not a suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny by the courts. The Supremae Court
has limited suspect classifications to those over which the person has no control. The father of an
illegitimate child has complete control of his status, and therefore cannot claim that he has been
made part of a suspect classification with respect to the distinction between unwed fathers and all
other parents. Marcus, Equal Protection: The Custody of the Illegitimate Child, II . FAm. L 1. 38
(1972). He may legitimate the child, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 49-10 (1984), he may acknowledge pater-
nity, or he may petition the court for a determination of paternity. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14
(1984 & Supp. 1988).
71. Other justifications for the common law presumption are discussed at text accompanying
nn. 130-34, infra.
72. See Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592, discussed at text accompanying no. 3-9,
supm.
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stantially related to the achievement of that objective. 3 The common
law rule that gives the unwed mother paramount rights to custndy over
the father of her children creates a gender based classification.* While
this classification arguably serves the substantial state objective of pro-
viding for the best interest of its illegitimate children, the classification
bears little, if any, relationship to that objective.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue in Caban v.
Mohammed. 4 Appellant Abdiel Caban and appellee Maria Mohammed
lived together for a little over five years, during which time they were
never married. While they were living together, appellee gave birth to
two children. When the couple separated, Mohammed and the children
began living with appellee Kazin Mohammed, whom she later married.
Over the next two years, the children continued to reside with appellees,
but appellant remained in communication with the children, and they
lived with him intermittently. Appellees filed a petition to adopt the chil-
dren in January, 1976. Appellant and his new wife, Nina, cross peti-
tioned for adoption. At the hearing on the petition and cross petition,
both couples were represented by counsel and were allowed to present
evidence and to cross-examine witnesses."3
The trial court granted appellees' petition for adoption, thereby termi-
nating all of appellant's parental rights to the children. Under New York
law,76 the putative father's consent was not necessary for adoption of his
child by the child's stepfather, although he was entitled to be heard in
opposition to the adoption. On the other hand, the natural mother's con-
sent was required for adoption by the putative father and his wife. Since
appellee Maria Mohammed withheld her consent, appellant could not
adopt his children, and he could only prevent the adoption by Maria and
her husband by showing that the best interests of the child would not
permit the adoption."
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated, "it is clear that [the New York
statute] treats unmarried parents differently according to their sex."'78
The Court quoted the test from Craig v. Boren, that to withstand consti-
tutional challenge, "gender based distinctions 'must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."' 7" In response to appellees' argument that a mother
73. Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (court declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute
that prohibited the sale of beer to males under 21 and to females under 18).
74. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
75. Id. at 382-83.
76. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § s 110-111 (McKinney 1977).
77. Id. at 384.
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id. (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197).
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bears a closer relationship with her children than a father, the Court
responded,
maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance.
Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their
newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations
would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the
age of the child increased. The present case demonstrates that an unwed
father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that
of the motherWo
The Court determined that the gender-based distinction in Caban did
not bear a substantial relation to the important state interest of providing
for the well-being of illegitimate children, since it was possible that the
unwed father may provide the most suitable home for his children. The
rule had the effect of classifying all unwed fathers as less qualified than
unwed mothers to care for their children. Because the Court reached its
decision based on appellant's equal protection argument, it did net reach
the due process argument.8'
The common law rule that the unwed mother has paramount rights to
custody unless she is shown unfit bears a striking resemblance to the stat-
utory scheme declared unconstitutional in Caban. If the objective of the
state in creating such a classification is to protect the welfare of its illegit-
imate children, the rule fails constitutional scrutiny because it is not sub-
stantially related to the objective to be served. The best interests of
illegitimate children will be served by looking strictly at which parent
can best provide for the children's welfare, without regard to antiquated
presumptions about which parent is better suited to provide care for the
children.
In Parham v. Hughes, "' the Supreme Court upheld what appears at
first glance to be a gender-based distinction between an unwed mother
and an unwed father. In Parham, the appellant was the biological father
of an illegitimate child who was killed in an automobile accident along
with the child's mother. The appellant had never legitimated the child
pursuant to Georgia law, but had contributed to his support. The child
used the same last name as appellant.8 3
The appellant filed a wrongful death action against the appellee, the
driver of the other car involved in the collision. The appellee moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that appellant was not entitled to
wrongful death damages for his illegitimate son. Under the Georgia stat-
ute, the mother of an illegitimate child could sue for wrongful death of
80. Id. at 389.
81. Id. at 393-94.
82. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
83. Id. at 349.
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the child, but the father could sue only if he had legitimated the child."
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the Georgia statute violated the due process and the equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Georgia Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the Georgia statute was rationally related to three
legitimate state interests: "(1) the interest in avoiding difficult problems
of proving paternity in wrongful death actions; (2) the interest in promot-
ing a legitimate family unit; and (3) the interest in setting a standard of
morality by not according to the father of an illegitimate child the statu-
tory right to sue for the child's death." 5
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court first deter-
mined whether the Georgia statute was invidiously discriminatory -
whether the classification was one which would be considered "suspect."
The appellant relied on cases in which the Court had invalidated statu-
tory classifications based on illegitimacy and on gender to support his
argument that the Georgia statute violated the equal protection clause.
The Court distinguished both lines of cases, however.
The Court first recognized that state classifications that discriminate
between legitimate and illegitimate children have been held to violate the
equal protection clause.86 The justification for such classifications is
often to condemn extra marital sexual relations. But, the Court noted, it
is unjust to punish the illegitimate child since he is not responsible for his
birth and is powerless to change his situation. The same is not true for
the father of an illegitimate child. The father is responsible, along with
the mother, for the birth of the child, and it is the father alone who has
the power to legitimate his child. Since the father bears no immutable
characteristics which classify him as the father of an illegitimate child,
the cases regarding illegitimate children are inapposite. 87
Nor do the cases finding gender-based classifications unconstitutional
apply to the situation in Parham. "Underlying these decisions is the prin-
ciple that a State is not free to make overbroad generalizations based on
sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and wo-
men or which demean the ability or social status of the affected class." '8
The Georgia statute did not make overbroad generalizations based on
sex. The classification excluded only unwed fathers who had failed to
legitimate their children. Unwed fathers who had legitimated their chil-
dren were afforded the same rights to sue for wrongful death of their
84. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1307 (1978).
85. 441 US. at 350.
86. Id. at 352 (citing Trimble v. Gordon. 430 U.S. 762 (1977);, Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)).
87. 441 U.S. at 352-53.
88. Id. at 354.
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children as were other parents.89
Since there was no suspect classification involved in Parham, the
Court applied the rational basis test and determined that the state had a
legitimate interest in avoiding fraudulent wrongful death claims. With-
out some assurance that the plaintiff in a wrongful death action was in-
deed the parent of the deceased child, there could be multiple suits on the
death of a single child, all brought by persons claiming to be the natural
father. The court found that the Georgia statute allowing the unwed
father to sue for wrongful death of his illegitimate child only if he had
legitimated the child was a rational solution.'
Again, in Lehr v. Robertson,9" the Court refused to find a violation of
the unwed father's right to equal protection. In Lehr, the mother of an
illegitimate child and her husband filed for adoption of the child when
the child was two years old. The natural father of the child challenged
the adoption on the basis that he was not afforded notice of the adoption
proceeding or an opportunity to be heard.92 New York maintained a
"putative father registry," which allowed a father registered to receive
notice of any proceeding to adopt his child. Appellant had not entered
his name in the register. Indeed, he had done none of the things that
would have entitled him to notice under New York law.9"
The Court applied the Craig v. Boren " test and determined that the
New York law was substantially related to the important state purpose of
establishing procedures for the orderly adoption of illegitimate children.
The Court noted that the classification was not between similarly situ-
ated parents since the mother had cared for the child since birth and the
father had never established any relationship, custodial, personal, or fi-
nancial, with the child.9
The facts of Parham and Lehr are distinguishable from those out of
which a claim for custody would arise under section 49-15. In the first
instance, a prerequisite for seeking custody under section 49-15 is an ad-
judication of paternity pursuant to section 49-14. There can be no doubt,
then, that the putative father seeking custody is indeed the father of the
child in question. The classification set up by the common law presump-
tion in favor of the unwed mother over the putative father is precisely a
gender-based classification. There is no legitimate reason to assume that
89. Id. at 355-56.
90. Id. at 357-58.
91. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
92. Id. at 250.
93. Id. at 251. Other actions that would have entitled appellant to notice of the adoption pro-
ceeding included obtaining an adjudication of paternity, identifying himself as the father on the
child's birth certificate, living openly with the child and the child's mother, and holding himself out
as the father of the child. Id.
94. See text accompanying n. 73, supra.
95. 463 U.S. at 267.
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the mother will be better suited to care for a minor child than the father.
The North Carolina legislature recognized this when it adopted section
50-13.2, which provides that between the father and mother of a legiti-
mate child, there can be no presumption regarding who is better suited to
have custody of the minor child."
One possible justification for having the presumption in favor of the
mother is to punish the putative father for "flouting public morality."9
The unwed mother, however, is just as guilty as the father in this respect.
It is irrational for the state to punish one of the guilty parties by denying
him a fair opportunity to provide for his child's welfare, and at the same
time reward an equally guilty party by creating a presumption that she is
the best suited to provide for the child. Both parents were responsible for
bringing the child into this world, and they should have an equal oppor-
tunity to seek custody of the child. A presumption that arbitrarily favors
the mother over the father bears no relationship to the state's objective of
caring for its illegitimate children by awarding custody to the party with
whom the child's best interests will be met. As such, the presumption is
an unconstitutional violation of the unwed father's right to equal protec-
tion of the law.
B. The Illegitimate Child's Right to Equal Protection
The common law rule that the mother has paramount rights to cus-
tody of her illegitimate child over the father distinguishes illegitimate
children from legitimate children. In North Carolina, when the custody
of legitimate children is at issue, the trial court is bound by section 50-
13.2(a) to determine what is in the children's best interest and to award
custody on that basis alone. On the other hand, when the child in ques-
tion is illegitimate, the common law presumption precludes a determina-
tion of what is in the best interest of the child unless the mother is shown
to be unfit.98
The United States Supreme Court has found state classifications that
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children to be unconstitu-
tional violations of the illegitimate child's right to equal protection. In
Levy v. Louisiana," the Court considered a Louisiana statutory scheme
that allowed legitimate children to sue for wrongful death of their
mother, but denied the same cause of action to illegitimate children. The
Court held that this statutory scheme was unconstitutional as violative of
the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection.
96. See text accompanying n. 45. supra.
97. Marcus, supra note 70, at 27.
98. An illustration of this is round in Jolly . Queen, 264 N.C 711, 142 S.E.2d 314. See text
accompanying nn. 3-9. supra.
99. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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The Court said that a state may not make a classification which "con-
stitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class,"'" and ap-
plied a rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the
Louisiana law.' 0 ' Finding no rational basis for the Louisiana statutory
scheme, the Court concluded that it was invidious to discriminate against
illegitimate children in this circumstance.
Three years later in Labine v. Vincent, the Court examined a Louisiana
law that allowed collateral relatives of an intestate unwed father to in-
herit his estate to the exclusion of his illegitimate daughter."0 2 The de-
ceased had acknowledged paternity of his daughter, but had never
legitimated her.
The Labine Court distinguished Levy v. Louisiana on the basis that the
children in Levy were totally precluded from recovering for the wrongful
death of the mother, while the child in Labine could have inherited from
her father's estate if he followed any one of three procedures. By leaving
a will, the father could have bequeathed his daughter up to one-third of
his estate; °3 he could have legitimated her so that she would be entitled
to inherit on the same grounds as a legitimate child; or he could have
written on his acknowledgment of paternity that he desired to legitimate
her.' o
The Court gave great deference to a state's legislative power to create
rules of intestate succession,"°5 and noted that there were other classifica-
tions of heirs that were discriminated against. Under the Louisiana
scheme, descendants take to the exclusion of ascendants, and ascendants
to the exclusion of collateral relations."0 6 On this basis, the Court, in a
five to four decision, held that the Louisiana statutes did not violate the
equal protection rights of illegitimate children.
Even in light of Labine, the common law presumption in favor of the
unwed mother does not pass constitutional scrutiny. The State of North
Carolina has provided that the best interest of the child shall control
custody disputes involving a legitimate-child1t° The common law pre-
sumption provides that the mother of an illegitimate child has para-
100. Id. at 71.
101. Id.
102. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). LA. Civ. CODE AN?.. art 206 provided: "Illegitimate children,
though duly acknowledged, can not claim the rights of legitimate children .... " Art. 919 provided:
Natural children are called to the inheritance o their natural father, who has duly acknowledged
them, when he has left no descendents nor ascendents. nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife.
and to the exclusion only of the State." quoted in 401 U.S. at 534.
103. Louisiana law limited an illegitimate child to one-thiird of his father's estate, even when the
father died testate. 401 U.S. at 539.
104. id.
105. Id. at 536-37.
106. Id. at 537.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1997).
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mount rights to custody of her child over the father, even if the best
interest of the child would be met by placing custody with the father.
The only way an unwed father can gain custody of his child under the
common law rule is to show that the mother is unfit. Nothing the father
or the child can do will erase the presumption, and it therefore acts as a
bar to the child's best interest.
Between 1972 and 1973, the Supreme Court declared three different
state statutes unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection rights
of illegitimate children." 3 In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Ch,"°
the Court struck down a Louisiana worker's compensation statute.110
The statute allowed legitimate and acknowledged illegitimate children to
recover for the wrongful death of their father but relegated unacknowl-
edged children to a lesser status and allowed them to recover only if the
benefits were not exhausted by awards to other children.
The Court stated that the test of whether a statute violates the equal
protection clause is whether the statutory classification, at a minimum,
bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."II But the
Court further stated that "when state statutory classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter
scrutiny."" 2 The Court looked closely at Louisiana's stated purpose be-
hind the statute. That purpose was to protect "legitimate family rela-
tionships.""' 3 The court recognized that this was a legitimate state
interest. However, in a much quoted passage, the Court concluded that
the statutory scheme bore no significant relationship to the recognized
purposes behind the worker's compensation statutes:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's con-
demnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.
Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffec-
tual - as well as an unjust - way of deterring the parent. Courts are
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless chil-
dren, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down dis-
criminatory laws relating to status of birth where - as in this case - the
classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or
108. New Jersey welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973);, Weber x Aetna Casualty d Surety Co.. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
109. 406 U.S. 164.
110. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1021(3).
II. 406 US. at 172.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 173 (quoting 257 La. 424. 433, 242 So. 2d 567, 570).
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otherwise. 14
In Gomez v. Perez,"' the Court examined a Texas law that allowed
legitimate children the right to paternal support but denied the same
right to illegitimate children. The Court held the law was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the illegitimate children's rights to equal protection.
The Court stated that once the state had created a judicially enforceable
right in favor of legitimate children to paternal support, it could not deny
that right to illegitimate children solely because their father had not mar-
ried their mother. "For a State to do so is 'illogical and unjust.' 
In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,'17 the Court
struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection
clause a New Jersey welfare law that provided assistance only to married
couples with legitimate children. The Court noted that the law provided
assistance to legitimate children but operated almost invariably to deny
assistance to illegitimate children."'
In 1977, the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon,"19 a case challenging
the constitutionality of the Illinois intestate law that allowed illegitimate
children to inherit from their mothers, but not their fathers, while al-
lowing legitimate children to inherit from both parents. The only
method by which an illegitimate child could be legitimated was by inter-
marriage of his parents. 20
In holding that the intestate scheme was an unconstitutional violation
of equal protection, the court quoted the test set out in Weber, "'mhis
court requires at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' ,21 The Court recog-
nized that illegitimacy is "analogous in many respects to the personal
characteristics that have been held to be suspect when used as the basis of
statutory differentiations."' 22 While the Court conceded that it would
not apply a strict scrutiny test to classifications based on illegitimacy, it
stated that the scrutiny "was not a tc -thless one,"' 23 thus indicating that
the test was an intermediate one between the rational basis test and the
strict scrutiny test.
In Lalli Y. Lalli,124 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New
114. Id. at 175-76. quoted in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1. 7-8 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977); 411 U.S. at 620.
115. 409 U.S. 535.
116. Id. at 538 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
117. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
118. Id. at 619-20.
119. 430 U.S. 762.
120. Id. at 764-65.
121. Id. at 766 (quoting 406 U.S. at 172).
122. Id. at 767.
123. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
124. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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York intestate statute that allowed illegitimate children to inherit from
their father only if there had been a finding of paternity during the puta-
tive father's lifetime.125 The Court referred to Trimble v. Gordon, and
stated that the test to be applied to classifications based on illegitimacy is
whether the classification is substantially related to a permissible state
interest.'26 The Court concluded that the state had a substantial interest
in providing for intestate succession and in avoiding fraudulent claims by
alleged children of the deceased. 2 " The Court further concluded that
the New York requirement that paternity be proved during the life of the
putative father was "substantially related to the important state interests
the statute was intended to promote."' 2
Thus, under Lalli v. Lalli, to determine the constitutionality of the
common law rule that the mother has a paramount right to custody of
her illegitimate child over the child's father, the question is whether the
common law rule is substantially related to an important state interest.' 29
As a first step, one must determine what interest the state is attempting
to advance by continuing to apply the common law rule.
One state interest may be to encourage family relationships and dis-
courage sexual relations outside the marriage. Another state interest
may be to punish putative fathers for engaging in illicit relationships that
end in the birth of an illegitimate child. A third, and the most legitimate,
interest is to advance the welfare of illegitimate children. While each of
these justifications may be considered legitimate state interests, the com-
mon law presumption bears no relation, substantial or otherwise, to those
interests.
There is no foundation for the belief that giving the mother of an ille-
gitimate child the paramount right to custody of the child will discourage
sexual relations outside marriage.130 Indeed, the common law presump-
tion may encourage single women who are approaching the end of their
child bearing years to conceive an illegitimate child, knowing the father
125. Id. at 262.
126. Id. at 265.
127. Id. at 271.
128. Id. at 275-76.
129. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized this test: "The United State Supreme
Court has made it clear that when considering statutes based on illegitimacy, courts are to appy an
intermediate level of review which requires that the statute be substantially related to permissible
state interests." In re Estate of Stem v. Stem. 66 N.C. App.. 507, 511, 311 S.E.2d 909. 911 (1984).
Subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have also reaffirmed the test set out in
Lalli. See. ,g;, Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986) (reas statute of limitations relating to
paternity and support actions for illegitimate children held unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection clause, Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1. 8 (1982) (statute interpreted so as not to reach
constitutional question, United States v. Clark. 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) (provision of Civil Service
Retirement Act held unconstitutional violation of illegitimate children's right to equal protection).
130. See Marcus, supra note 70, at 45-46.
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could not gain custody of the child without proving she is an unfit
mother.
The possible state interest in punishing the father for his illicit acts
fails for two reasons. It was not just the father who produced the illegiti-
mate child. Since both the mother and the father are equally responsible
for the conception of the child, if one should be punished, so should the
other.13 ' Moreover, application of the common law rule acts to the detri-
ment of the illegitimate child since a trial court, under the common law
rule, may not determine who should have custody based solely on the
best interest of the child.'32 The common law rule in effect punishes the
illegitimate child for his parents' illicit sexual relations, and the Supreme
Court has said that it is illogical and unjust to punish the innocent child
for the actions of his parents.1 3
3
The final possible state interest in keeping the common law presump-
tion is to protect the welfare of illegitimate children, but application of
the common law presumption to meet this interest is also illogical. If the
trial court is bound to award custody in accordance with the common
law presumption regardless of whether the child's best interest will be
served by placing custody with the mother,'I the state's interest will not
be met.
In light of the Supreme Court cases dealing with classifications based
on legitimacy, the common law presumption must be declared unconsti-
tutional. North Carolina has seen fit to award custody of legitimate chil-
dren solely on the basis of what is in their best interests. The equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates that illegiti-
mate children be afforded the same protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina legislature intended to abrogate the common law
presumption in favor of the unwed mother when it passed section 49-15
providing that custody of illegitimate children shall be decided in the
same manner as custody of legitimate children. Sections 49-15, and 50-
13.2, when read in pari materia, require the trial court to award custody
solely on the basis of what is in the child's best interest, without applying
any presumptions in favor of either parent.
However, even those hardened skeptics who would argue that the
common law presumption is still in effect in North Carolina must con-
cede that under a constitutional analysis, the presumption fails as viola-
131. See text accompanying n. 97, supra.
132. See Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965), discussed at text accompanying
nn. 3-9, supra.
133. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.
134. See Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).
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tive of the equal protection clause. The presumption is an
unconstitutional violation of the father's right to equal protection, both
when the classification is made between putative fathers and all other
parents, and when the classification is made between putative fathers and
unwed mothers. Moreover, the presumption operates to infringe upon
the equal protection rights of illegitimate children by allowing their best
interests to be subordinated to an antiquated rule that bears no relation
to a legitimate state interest while providing that custody of legitimate
children shall be based on their best interests.
The North Carolina courts are encouraged to set the record straight
on this issue at the earliest opportunity by holding that the custody of
illegitimate children shall be based solely on what is in their best inter-
ests. The illegitimate children of this state deserve nothing less.
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